Peru’s Congress is ruthlessly dismantling crime-fighting institutions, benefiting the country’s mafia and increasing the risk of instability, migration and manipulation by malicious foreign actors.
Last month, Congress passed a law that prohibits prosecutors from investigating migrant trafficking, illegal logging, embezzlement and 56 other crimes that are classified as organized crime and carry prison sentences of six years or less. That means less time to investigate such cases and more hurdles in detaining suspects. The law, which took effect on August 9, also prohibits investigators from raiding suspected criminal headquarters to collect evidence, even if there is an arrest warrant, unless the suspect in question and a defense attorney are present in person.
Peru’s leading private sector organization, the National Confederation of Private Entrepreneurial Institutions (CONFIEP), took the unusual step of asking Congress to put the law on hold, and the Attorney General’s Office announced it would file a constitutional complaint against it. In a June poll, 75% of respondents said they opposed the changes to the raid rules. But Congress, which received only 4% popular approval,, didn’t listen.
Still, there is a group of voices that could attract the attention of lawmakers if they speak out forcefully enough.: the US State Department and its European counterparts. They have every reason to fight back. For over a year, the coalition of parties that control Congress—the real center of power in Peru, given the political weakness of President Dina Boluarte—has been limiting the authorities’ capacity to solve crimes. Congress limited prosecutors’ ability to strike deals, amnestied illegal deforestation crimes committed before 2024, passed a law preventing police from seizing explosives from illegal miners, and watered down the law against organized crime. Now Peru’s ombudsman, a close ally of Congress, is trying to have Peru’s asset confiscation law declared unconstitutional, which would make it much harder and slower for authorities to seize weapons, homes, and other assets from criminal groups.
If Congress continues to weaken law enforcement and endanger regional stability, there must be a coordinated international response.
It is the worst possible time for Peru to lose its crime-fighting capacity. Organized crime is nothing new to the country, but recent brazen attacks are. In the past few weeks, two union leaders threatened by extortion gangs were gunned down within 24 hours; the country’s largest gold mine was attacked again by illegal miners; and a prominent indigenous leader in the Peruvian Amazon was murdered after denouncing drug traffickers.
These are not the only signs that the mafia is becoming more powerful than the state. According to prosecutors, extortion cases nationwide quadrupled from 2021 to 2023 (from just under 5,000 per year to over 22,000), spreading to every corner of the country and economy. Illegal miners, Peru’s biggest criminal financiers, exported some $4.8 billion worth of illegal gold in 2023, nearly half of South America’s total, and they are clearing the Amazon and clogging roads that mining companies need to export. Since the pandemic, Peruvian cocaine traffickers have joined forces with Colombian and Brazilian criminal groups to expand large-scale coca cultivation to new parts of the Amazon. Members of the Albanian mafia are showing up in Peruvian ports with increasing frequency, as they did in Ecuador before the country entered its violent downward spiral. Don’t let Peru’s low murder rate fool you. This is what a crisis looks like before it hits.
Pressure is not pointless
With the Andes already in turmoil from Venezuela to Ecuador, it is not in the interest of the United States, Europe or Peru’s neighbors to provoke another destabilizing crisis. But the approach so far – appeals to shared democratic values, photo ops with controversial independent judges and discussions behind closed doors – does not seem to be working.
Diplomats from the United States and Europe should consider a more proactive approach and consider consequences for the leaders of Peru’s major parties if they continue to weaken the rule of law or attempt to compromise the independence of Peru’s electoral institutions ahead of the 2026 elections.
Some doubts may be holding diplomats back: Could increasing international pressure push Peru into China’s arms? Could it exacerbate the country’s political instability? Or could it simply fail to convince politicians?
First, on China. If the goal of gently expressing concern about the erosion of the rule of law, largely in private, was to lure Peru away from China, it is clearly not working. Under Boluarte, Chinese firms recently gained a monopoly on Lima’s electricity supply and will soon inaugurate the Chancay megaport, a dual-use facility and the first Chinese logistics hub in Latin America. In June, Boluarte visited Beijing to improve Peru-China trade relations, signing a deal that will commission tech giant Huawei to train 20,000 Peruvians, and in January, Chinese military officials visited Lima to discuss joint exercises.
Boluarte and the parties that currently dominate Congress are likely too unpopular to survive the 2026 elections, assuming they leave electoral institutions intact and the election is free and fair. A more effective way to compete with China in the long term would be to focus on building credibility with the Peruvian people – and whichever leadership they elect next – by using all available diplomatic tools now to push back on Congress’s anti-rule-of-law agenda.
Second, stability. The Peruvian government may no longer be the ministerial carousel it was under former President Pedro Castillo. But it is not just the frequent turnover of personnel that creates instability. It is also reckless, destructive policies. The weakening of law enforcement by Congress sets the stage for more social conflict, more criminal violence, and probably more protests and emigration – in short, for instability. A foreign policy that does not take this into account will not strengthen political stability, but undermine it.
And finally, the effectiveness of pressure. Some may fear that leaders of Peru’s major parties, who set the agenda in Congress, will not respond to measures such as visa restrictions in the same way that Guatemalan lawmakers did last year. But that is far from certain. Peru’s party leaders travel frequently to the United States and Europe, own expensive homes there, have family members there, children studying there, and have private business relationships. This is not true of the average Peruvian congressman, but they are not the decision-makers – those are the party bosses.
Fortunately, not all party leaders are equally determined to weaken law enforcement. Some have thick files with the state attorney general and are investigating illegal campaign finance. Others are just along for the ride and can be persuaded to quit – if it costs them something to continue.
Diplomats should prevent these party leaders from taking even more power away from law enforcement agencies and interfering in electoral institutions before 2026. Otherwise, they risk being faced with a mafia state rather than a normal government after the next elections.
Keywords: Dina Boluarte, Peru, security
The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinions of America quarterly or its editors.
