Indonesia is on the path to political change ahead of the inauguration of current Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto on October 20. There is much speculation about what foreign policy issues the new president might bring to office. Will Prabowo continue the approach of the old President Joko Widodo? Or will he radically depart from his predecessor?
In my opinion, both are likely at the same time.
Prabowo will be more involved in world affairs in the future – a “personalist” approach to foreign policy with active involvement of the president. This will be a major change from Jokowi, who, with some exceptions, focused more on domestic policy.
In terms of content, however, Probowo will adopt a pragmatic stance towards the major powers that is similar to Jokowi’s approach.
Prabowo began his presidential campaign by promising to continue Jokowi’s policies and build on his legacy. Prabowo named Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate, which earned him the president’s support during the campaign. Prabowo promised to implement Jokowi’s key policies, including shifting industry downstream, developing infrastructure, and moving the capital to Borneo.
However, to complete these programs, Prabowo will need to convince major investors – especially China – to finance the projects and will also continue to modernize Indonesia’s defense sector.
But Prabowo brings his own “style” of foreign policy with him. And it is already clearly visible.
Prabowo seems more interested in resolving tensions through active engagement at the leadership level than in strengthening regional or international institutions.
Following his clear election victory in February, Prabowo made a number of trips abroad. In April, for example, he visited China, Japan and Malaysia in his capacity as defense minister and president-elect. He met with President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, among others, and discussed economic and defense cooperation with Indonesia.
In May, he made another trip to the Middle East, where he met several regional leaders to underscore Indonesia’s commitment to resolving the Gaza conflict through peacekeepers. He later spoke at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and met several international leaders, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Most recently, he also visited France, Serbia, Turkey and Russia and met with the heads of state and government of these countries, including President Vladimir Putin, to discuss bilateral cooperation.
These visits marked Prabowo’s “personalist” style of foreign policy, in which he favors face-to-face, bilateral meetings with heads of state and government. This contrasts with Jokowi’s more low-key approach, in which he employs multilateralism, less engagement at the presidential level, and delegation work with Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi.
This personalist approach does not surprise Prabowo. In a presidential debate at CSIS Indonesia in November 2023, Prabowo outlined what he called a “good-neighbor foreign policy.” He believed that Indonesia should continue its policy of non-alignment toward major powers, which is a consistent theme in Indonesia’s foreign policy tradition.
However, Prabowo also expressed his belief that Indonesia should seek good relations with other countries to maintain world peace.
Unlike Jokowi, Prabowo seems less enthusiastic about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the 11-country Southeast Asian alliance of which Indonesia is the largest member. While he mentioned the importance of cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors, he did not explicitly consider ASEAN a key player, focusing instead on cooperation with the United States and China. ASEAN also did not feature in Prabowo’s campaign manifesto, which was heavily dominated by defense modernization and national security interests.
Jokowi, for his part, had described ASEAN as “the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy.”
This waning enthusiasm for ASEAN, together with his vision of a “good neighbor” policy and his active personal engagement even before his inauguration as president, are an early indication of Prabowo’s attitude toward international affairs. Prabowo seems more interested in resolving tensions through active engagement at the leadership level than in strengthening regional or international institutions. But he would still maintain his pragmatic approach in dealing with major powers while being actively engaged in foreign policy.
A personalistic approach could also make Prabowo’s foreign policy unpredictable.
This could be good news for Australia. Canberra should not expect Prabowo to radically change the direction Jokowi has set for Indonesian-Australian relations. As long as Australia brings economic and security benefits to Indonesia, Prabowo will be keen to continue constructive engagement.
In fact, Prabowo is expected to sign a defence pact with Australia at the end of August; a visit to Australia is planned for this month.
However, a personalistic approach could also make Prabowo’s foreign policy unpredictable and sometimes slow given the magnitude of the problems he faces. It could also create discrepancies between his active foreign policy engagement and the leadership at the ministerial level, which could affect the progress of diplomatic relations.
Prabowo’s style will make it difficult to predict how Indonesia will engage with China in particular. It is likely that Prabowo will remain open to Chinese investment, especially if China funds Indonesia’s ambitious development projects. But that relationship will be determined from the top.
Australia should not expect Indonesia to take a strong stance against China or abandon its non-alignment policy in the event of US-China tensions. However, Australia can expect a more “active” Indonesia that is willing to work with many partners and use this to build a better relationship, at least at the leadership level.
