The Russian military’s slow response to Ukraine’s surprise attack – and to the country’s plans to create a buffer zone in the Kursk region – should cause Western political and military leaders to question many of their assumptions about this protracted war.
Both a former senior U.S. commander and a leading defense analyst with close ties to Ukraine believe that one should not jump to conclusions from the events of the past two weeks.
Nevertheless, many assumptions about the course of the conflict have been refuted since Kyiv launched this daring action – Russia’s first ground invasion since the end of World War II.
There are questions that the West should be asking itself as this operation unfolds. What are Russia’s actual capabilities? And what capacity does it have to sustain military operations?
NATO’s years of rebuilding and rearmament were linked to the belief that Russia would not stop at invading Ukraine, but would also advance into the Baltic states. In Latvia, one of these states, Canada leads a multinational brigade.
Experienced observers, especially from European defense and intelligence agencies, have issued dire warnings that the West has only a few years to prepare for a possible confrontation with Moscow and possibly other authoritarian powers.
Nevertheless, Ukraine, which was on the defensive in the east of its own territory, managed to launch a surprise offensive against Russia. Until last weekend, the objectives of this offensive were shrouded in strategic ambiguity.
In his evening address on Sunday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country’s daring military invasion was aimed at creating a buffer zone to prevent further attacks from Moscow across the border.
It was the first time that Zelensky clearly and publicly articulated the goal of the operation launched on August 6.
The initial assumption that Ukraine would not be able to regain the initiative before next year was shattered by this operation.
Phillip Karber, a lecturer at the National Defense University in Washington, said the West had passively assumed that Moscow had the advantage, would continue its advance in the eastern Donbass region and that there were no strategic alternatives.
“I would advise anyone who listens to me to attack where the Russians are not,” said Karber, who has close contacts with the Ukrainian military apparatus. “Try to force them to catch up. I think it’s good to take the initiative and force them onto the defensive.”
Some observers speculated that Ukraine was trying to withdraw Russian troops from Donbass to relieve pressure on its forces there.
If that were the case, Karber said, then the risk “really hasn’t paid off” and he fears the Ukrainians will soon face a determined counterattack on one or both shoulders of the salient. The Russians’ goal would be to encircle Ukrainian forces in a pocket, a tactic the Soviet Red Army mastered very well in World War II.
For NATO, the realisation is that the success of this attempt to create a buffer zone is far from certain, despite the images of Russian conscripts surrendering on social media.
“The Russian units are tough,” said Karber.
While that may be true, retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges said events over the past few months have revealed some serious weaknesses in both the Russian military and the Russian defense industry.
“We should hopefully find out – and I’m sure a lot of intelligence agencies are focused on this – what Russia’s real capabilities are. How well can they sustain their operations?” Hodges said.
“I think it has been clear for some time that Russia is not in a position to knock Ukraine out of the war as long as the West continues to provide even the modest amounts that we are now providing.”
Many experts warn that the Russian army is rebuilding to compensate for the huge losses in equipment and is learning from the catastrophic number of casualties it has suffered.
“I haven’t seen any major changes or innovations on the Russian side,” said Hodges, who was commander of the U.S. Army in Europe.
“It seems like they’re just trying to do more of the same, and certainly they’ve lost thousands of experienced soldiers and leaders who are now being replaced by those who are not as well trained or experienced. Where is the bottom of this barrel for Russia?”
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The use of Russian conscripts in the Kursk region also points to what Hodges called “serious manpower problems.” This shortage limits Russia’s ability to replace losses in soldiers and equipment on the battlefield, he said.
Hodges said the Russian arms industry does not produce anywhere near the amount needed and Moscow appears to be dependent on material from China, Iran and North Korea.
“It doesn’t feel like a sustainable level,” he said.
One of the most important findings for Hodges, however, was that the Kursk campaign disproved the assumption that drones on the battlefield had made the element of surprise unattainable in modern warfare.
“How could Ukraine build up enough capacity and launch an attack that seemed to surprise the Russians, just as it surprised most of us?” he asked.
“This really challenges the theory or the narrative that it’s impossible to conceal and effectively move large numbers of ground troops with drones. It looks to me like Ukraine has somehow created a counter-drone capability or bubble that has allowed them to do things that weren’t even conceivable six, eight, or 10 months ago.”